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COMPETING BIDS IN CLASS
ACTION SETTLEMENTS
Geoffrey P. Miller*
The Article suggests a strategy that might be useful for ensuring the
fairness of some class action settlements. When counsel presents a
settlement for evaluation, the court could allow objectors to file ex post
bids for lead counsel rights. The bids would be backed by guarantees
that class members would be no worse off if the lead counsel rights are
transferred. If a proposed guarantee offers satisfactory assurances, the
court would presumptively transfer lead counsel rights to the objector's
counsel. When the case is eventually resolved, the attorneys' fee would
be allocated between new and old counsel according to a principle that
provides rewards for maximizing class recovery while not impairing
incentives to bring suit. Ex post bids could have special relevance in the
context of "reverse auctions" in which the defendant effectively sells the
case to the low-bidding class counsel, and might improve class action
settlements more generally as a corrective for bad results and as a
deterrent against abuse.
I. THE SETTLEMENT DILEMMA
Class litigation is brought on behalf of groups of persons too
numerous to join individually.' Because of collective action problems,
absent class members do not control the litigation. The class action
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device uses the fiction that class interests will be protected by the
representative plaintiff whose name graces the marquee. But
representative plaintiffs are usually mere eponyms.2 The litigation is
controlled by plaintiffs' attorneys, who function as entrepreneurs with
little monitoring by their ostensible clients. In consequence, counsel may
prefer their own interests to those of the class.' The arena of greatest
conflict is settlement. Because of the omnipresent specter of a trade in
which the attorney accepts a higher fee in exchange for lower class
compensation, a settlement cannot be rubber-stamped. Rather, the trial
judge must approve the settlement only if she finds it to be fair,
adequate, and reasonable.'
Judges face significant obstacles in carrying out the task of
evaluating proposed settlements. Because the matter has been settled,
plaintiffs' counsel is now aligned with the defendant. These parties often
make good faith efforts to present an accurate analysis, but their
common interest in promoting the settlement undermines the safeguard
of adversarial testing.6 Objectors to the settlement can provide a
corrective by engaging in an independent appraisal But they do not
2. The minimal role of the named plaintiff is stressed in John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation
of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 877, 877 (1987); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The
Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative
Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 677-78 (1986); Howard M. Downs, Federal Class Actions:
Diminished Protection for the Class and the Case for Reform, 73 NEB. L. REV. 646, 659 (1994);
Alon Klement, Who Should Guard The Guardians? A New Approach For Monitoring Class Action
Lawyers, 21 REV. LITIG. 25, 27-28 (2002); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs'
Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation. Economic Analysis and
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 42 (1991). Securities fraud litigation under the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in
sections of 15 U.S.C. §§ 77, 78), may present a somewhat different situation in light of the more
active role for representative plaintiffs contemplated in that statute.
3. For discussion, see Geoffrey P. Miller, Conflicts of Interest in Class Action Litigation: An
Inquiry into the Appropriate Standard (forthcoming 2003).
4. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
5. The standard is variously expressed, but the essential inquiry is the same. See, e.g., In re
Jiffy Lube Sec. Litig., 927 F.2d 155, 159 (4th Cir. 1991); Jones v. Nuclear Pharmacy, Inc., 741 F.2d
322, 324 (10th Cir. 1984); Reed v. Gen. Motors Corp., 703 F.2d 170, 172 (5th Cir. 1983); Grunin v.
Int'l House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 122 (8th Cir. 1975). The Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules recommends that the standard be .'fair, reasonable, and adequate."' ADVISORY COMM. ON
THE FED. RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMM. 39 (2002).

6. See Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at 46 (referring to fairness hearings as "pep rallies
jointly orchestrated by plaintiffs' counsel and defense counsel").
7. See In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768,
803 (3d Cir. 1995); Robert B. Gerard & Scott A. Johnson, The Role of the Objector in Class Action
Settlements-A Case Study of the General Motors Truck "Side Saddle" Fuel Tank Litigation, 31
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 409, 417 (1997); Edward Brunet, Class Action Objectors: Screening Information
to Enhance Efficiency and Fairness, U. CHI. LEGAL F. (forthcoming 2003).
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solve the problem. Because objectors enter at the last minute, they are
often poorly informed and offer little of substance. And objectors have
their own conflicts. Some are stand-ins for disappointed lawyers who
want a larger share of the spoils. Others just want to hold up the
settlement to extract a commission.
Lacking fully effective assistance from others, the judge has no
alternative but to investigate the settlement herself.9 The task is difficult.
The judge is largely at the mercy of the evidence introduced by the
parties.' ° Although the judge can observe the terms of the settlement,
these are often difficult to quantify." But the trial judge's difficulties go
beyond appraising the settlement. That analysis is meaningless unless
compared with what might have been obtained from continued litigation.
Presumably, a court should approve a settlement only if the result is as
good as what could have been secured if the case went to judgment (or if
class counsel fought harder in settlement negotiations). The amount that
could have been obtained depends on intangible factors such as the
strength of the class claims at time of settlement, the willingness of the
defendant to compromise, the attitudes of judge and jury, developments
in parallel cases, possible changes in applicable law, and likely results of
appeals. Moreover, because the court is comparing the bird-in-the-hand
of settlement against a covey of outcomes if the case proceeds, riskaversion can be a consideration. As risk aversion increases, the class
would have a greater preference for certainty of settlement over the
vagaries of litigation. None of these questions is easy to evaluate; all of
them together are daunting.
Recognizing these difficulties, the appellate courts offer guidance
in the form of factor tests. The Fourth Circuit, for example, calls
attention to "(1) the posture of the case at the time settlement was

8. These objectors resemble the sokaiya, shadowy figures who extort money by threatening
to disrupt Japanese shareholder meetings. See Mark D. West, The Pricingof ShareholderDerivative
Actions in Japan and the United States, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1436, 1451-52 (1994).
9. So far, courts have not experimented with privatizing the review process by appointing
monitors with incentives to maximize class benefits. See Klement, supra note 2, at 61
(recommending private monitor approach).
10. Courts may have power under the class action rules and principles of equity jurisprudence
to take an active role in developing information relevant to assessing the proposed settlement. But
this inquisitorial style is unfamiliar to American judges. See John H. Langbein, The German
Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHi. L. REV. 823, 831-32 (1985). Judges almost always take a
passive role at fairness hearings, allowing the parties to determine what information will be
presented. See Klement, supra note 2, at 45-46 (stressing the passive role of courts in reviewing
settlement proposals).
11. See Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV.
1051, 1059-60 n.25 (1996).
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proposed, (2) the extent of discovery that had been conducted, (3) the
circumstances surrounding the negotiations, and (4) the experience of
counsel."' 2 In the Fifth Circuit, the inquiries are:
(I)
the existence of fraud or collusion behind the settlement; (2) the
complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation; (3) the stage
of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed; (4) the
probability of plaintiffs' success on the merits; (5) the range of
possible recovery; and (6) the opinions of the class counsel, class
representatives, and absent class members [and objectors]. 3
The Eighth Circuit requires analysis of four factors, with greatest
emphasis on the first: (1) "the strength of the case for plaintiffs on the
merits, balanced against the amount offered in the settlement"; (2) "the
defendant's overall financial condition and ability to pay"; (3) "the
complexity, length and expense of further litigation"; and (4) "the
amount of opposition to the settlement."' 4 Other circuits have their own
lists. These factor tests provide some guidance, but not much. They
direct the trial court's inquiry, but they are not comprehensive and
provide little help in assessing how the factors should be weighed or
what to do in the event of conflict. Moreover, the inquiries that these
tests encourage are themselves open-textured and uncertain.
Ultimately, the evaluation of the settlement is committed to the trial
court's "discretion."' 5 But discretion is no cure-all either-otherwise
appellate courts would not try so hard to provide standards to guide it.
Although trial courts undoubtedly have the ability to exercise judgment
based on experience, intuitions do not guarantee reliability. Class action
settlements do not have auras, and if they did, trial courts could not read
them. Behind the portentous references to discretion may be little more
than a sense of the inadequacy of other strategies. Yet the case must be
decided and the court must do its best to protect the class.
In light of these difficulties, courts have turned to attorney
compensation as an ex ante device for inducing good outcomes. 6 In
12. In re Jiffy Lube Sec. Litig., 927 F.2d 155, 159 (4th Cir. 1991).
13. Reed v. Gen. Motors Corp., 703 F.2d 170, 172 (5th Cir. 1983); see Parker v. Anderson,
667 F.2d 1204, 1209 (5th Cir. 1982).
14. Grunin v. Int'l House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 124 (8th Cir. 1975) (quoting W. Va. v.
Charles Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1085 (2d Cir. 1971).
15. See, e.g., Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 101l, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that the
court's decision to approve or reject a settlement is "committed to the sound discretion of the trial
judge because he is 'exposed to the litigants, and their strategies, positions and proof') (quoting
Officers for Justice v. Civil Ser. Comm'n of S.F., 688 F.2d 615, 626 (9th Cir. 1982)).
16. See Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principaland Agent Relationship,
10 BELL J.EcON. 55, 55-56 (1979).
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particular, agency costs can be reduced by employing the percentage-ofrecovery method for calculating fees, which is now the favored approach
in class actions seeking money damages.17 Because attorneys get paid a
percentage of total recovery, they have an incentive to maximize class
benefits. But incentive alignment strategies rarely work perfectly.'8
Despite its superiority to other approaches, the percentage method is an
imperfect fix to the agency cost problem. Class attorneys who know
their compensation will be based on a percentage have an incentive to
settle too early,' 9 inflate the value of the relief obtained, ° or even collude
with the defendant. 2' The percentage approach may also overcompensate
counsel when liability is clear. 22 Accordingly, this methodology does not
relieve courts of the duty to oversee settlements.23 Yet, despite sanguine
fantasies that "well-developed" caselaw can ensure accurate fees,2 4 the
process is not scientific. Courts consider fee awards in analogous cases,
evidence on the risks of the litigation, and expert witness testimony
(among other factors).25 But at the end of the day they face the bugaboo
of judgment.

17. See Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 942, 963 (E.D. Tex. 2000).
Some courts utilize the percent-of-recovery approach exclusively. See, e.g, Camden I Condo. Ass'n,
Inc. v. Dunkle, 946 F.2d 768, 774 (11th Cir. 1991); Swedish Hosp. Corp. v. Shalala, I F.3d 1261,
1271 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Elsewhere, courts permit the alternative "lodestar" method either as a crosscheck, see, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Prides Litigation, 243 F.3d 722, 735 (3d Cir. 2001), as an
alternative methodology for calculating the fee, see, e.g., In re Continental Illinois Securities
Litigation, 962 P.2d 566, 572-73 (9th Cir. 1992), or, in a minority of jurisdictions, as the ostensibly
exclusive method (which may however be checked against the percentage method), see, e.g., In re
Agent Orange Products Liability Litigation, 818 F.2d 226, 232 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 824 (1987). More general equitable discretion methods are also used. See generally Geoffrey
P. Miller & Lori S. Singer, Nonpecuniary Class Action Settlements, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
97 (1997) (surveying methodologies across the federal circuits).
18. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L.
& ECON. 301, 304 (1983) (defining agency costs as the sum of the monitoring and bonding costs
plus residual loss).
19. See, e.g., In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 197 F.R.D. 71,77 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
20. See Miller & Singer, supra note 17, at 112.
21. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1373-84 (1995); Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps:
Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1047-48 (1995) (describing alleged
collusion in asbestos settlement).
22. See Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at 23-24 (noting that the percentage method effectively
guarantees that plaintiffs' attorneys will be systematically compensated at a rate higher than the rate
they would demand in an efficiently functioning competitive market).
23. See Miller, supra note 3.
24. See Third Circuit Task Force on Selection of Class Counsel, Selection of Class Counsel,
208 F.R.D. 340, 423 (2002) [hereinafter Third Circuit Task Force Report].
25. See id. at 423-24.
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An auction strategy offers a potential avenue for overcoming some
of these problems, at least in the context of large-scale, small-claim
cases. The purest form of auction would be for the trial court to organize
a judicial sale of the entire case. 6 The court would prepare an
informational package, advertise for bids, structure the auction, and
oversee the transfer of the proceeds to the class.27 Any party would be
allowed to bid, including the defendant which, if it won the auction,
would achieve an instant settlement. Whole-case auctions promise to
overcome the lawyer-client agency problem (since the winner of the
auction owns the claim)28 and offer immediate and certain compensation
for the class. If the whole-case auction worked, it would obviate the
problem of judicial review of class action settlements because the winner
of the auction could make settlement decisions without judicial
assistance. Whole-case auctions have been criticized, however, on the
grounds that the process would be plagued by information and financing
problems 9 and that the procedure is impracticable. ° Most commentators
have viewed whole-case auctions as theoretically interesting but not a
solution to the problem of class action settlements.'
A more limited approach, which has been used in real world
settings, is the auction of lead counsel rights. 2 The genius of lead
26. See Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at 105-08 (discussing whole-case auctions); Jonathan
R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, A Market Approach to Tort Reform Via Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 909, 912-14 (1995) (exploring potential use of whole-case auctions in mass tort cases)
hereinafter A Market Approach to Tort Reform].
27. See A Market Approach to Tort Reform, supra note 26, at 913.
28. However, the winner would have to litigate the case and, unless she acted as her own
counsel thereafter, would need to employ attorneys to conduct the litigation.
29. See Randall S. Thomas & Robert G. Hansen, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative
Lawsuits: A CriticalAnalysis, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 423, 425 (1993).
30. See Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 24, at 407.
31. See Thomas & Hansen, supra note 29, at 426 (arguing that the role of auctions in class
action suits must be limited).
32. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Questionable Case For Using Auctions To Select Lead
Counsel, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 889, 889 (2002); Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation, Auctions, and Other
Developments in the Selection of Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53,
80 (2001) [hereinafter Aggregation, Auctions, and Other Developments]; Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers On
The Auction Block: Evaluating The Selection Of Class Counsel By Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
650, 651 (2002) [hereinafter Lawyers on the Auction Block]; LAURAL L. HOOPER & MARIE LEARY,
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, AUCTIONING THE ROLE OF CLASS COUNSEL IN CLASS ACTION CASES:

A DESCRIPTIVE STUDY 6 (2001) (identifying fourteen cases in which courts utilized lead counsel
auctions); Andrew K. Niebler, In Search of Bargained-For Fees for Class Action Plaintiffs'
Lawyers: The Promise and Pitfalls of Auctioning the Position of Lead Counsel, 54 BUS. LAW. 763,
763 (1998); Note, Class Auctions: Market Models for Attorneys' Fees in Class Action Litigation,
113 HARV. L. REV. 1827, 1829 (2000). Judge Vaughn Walker pioneered the auction approach to
selection of class counsel in In re Oracle Securities Litigation, 131 F.R.D. 688, 697 (N.D.
Cal. 1990).
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counsel auctions is that they promise to emulate a market solution to
attorney compensation. Any rational purchaser would prefer to buy a
desired good or service at the lowest cost. Lead counsel auctions seek to
achieve this result in the selection of class counsel by assigning
representational rights to qualified attorneys who are willing to take on
the case at the lowest percentage of the recovery. Proponents of lead
counsel auctions assert that they reduce attorneys' fees, conserve on
judicial resources, select counsel on a more defensible basis than victory
in a race to the courthouse, reduce risk for attorneys by establishing the
fee methodology in advance, establish a data set of market-driven fees
that can be used as a basis for comparison in future cases, and introduce
competition into the class action bar.33 Despite these advantages, the
bulk of recent authority has been against lead counsel auctions, on the
grounds, inter alia, that they are difficult to structure, do not guarantee
the best outcome for the class, do not minimize fees, and may result in a
lower quality of representation. 34 In the case of securities fraud litigation
in particular, lead counsel auctions have come under criticism as being
inconsistent with the mandate of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act which specifies that the lead plaintiff selects class counsel.35 Given
the trend of opinion away from lead counsel auctions, exploration of
other approaches to handling attorney-client agency problems in class
action settlements appears to be in order.
II.

AN Ex POST BID APPROACH

This section proposes a different procedure to assist with the
problem of review of settlements: ex post bids for lead counsel rights.
Under an ex post bid approach, an objecting class member 36 would
guarantee that the class will be no worse off if lead counsel rights are
transferred. If an acceptable guarantee is provided, the court would
presumptively assign lead counsel rights to the attorney for the
dissenting party. The court would mandate that the litigation files be
33. See Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 24, at 370-72.
34. See id. at 373-74; Aggregation, Auctions, and Other Developments, supra note 32, at 8385; Lawyers on the Auction Block, supra note 32, at 681.
35. See In re Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d 726, 734-35 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that court-mandated
lead counsel auctions are not generally permissible in litigation under the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act); In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 220 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding the
same).
36. Any class member may object to a settlement, and (at least in federal court) can appeal an
adverse ruling. See Devlin v. Scardelletti, 122 S. Ct. 2005, 2013 (2002) (holding that an unnamed
class member who objects to a proposed settlement in federal court may take an appeal without
intervening).
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transferred from prior counsel to the new lead counsel. The court could
either reject the prior settlement or provisionally approve it but defer a
final decision until the results of the litigation under new counsel are
known. The case would then proceed as before.
To take a simple example, imagine that counsel seeks judicial
approval of a settlement under which the defendant will pay $10 million
in exchange for a general release. Out of this amount, counsel requests a
fee award of $3 million, leaving $7 million for the class. We assume that
these amounts will actually be paid. Suppose further that a class member
(or, more realistically, her attorney) believes that the defendant could
have been induced to pay more. In such a case the dissenting party
would be allowed to post a bond or other form of guarantee for the
proposed recovery ($10 million plus any amounts necessary to adjust for
delay in payment). If such a bond is posted and found to equal or exceed
the relief obtained in the proposed settlement, the court would
presumptively transfer lead counsel rights to the dissenter's attorney.
Now suppose that new lead counsel achieves a settlement of $16
million, with a request for $4 million in counsel fees and expenses.
Notice of the new settlement would be distributed to the class and the
matter would be set for a hearing. In reviewing the fairness of this
settlement, the court would take account of the fact that the class has
been made better off by the new counsel's actions (by a net of $5
million). The court would also evaluate the requested fee. If the fee is
found to be reasonable, the court would distribute the amount between
new and old counsel, attempting to make a fair allocation reflecting the
respective contributions of both while recognizing that the first counsel
did not achieve the best result for the class. The matter could be left to
the discretion of the trial court, or the court could experiment with a
formula. One possibility would be to allocate the fee based on the
amount of the recovery for which each lawyer is responsible (subject to
certain caps). In the example above, suppose the court concludes that the
requested $4 million fee is reasonable. The first counsel obtained $10
million and the second counsel obtained an additional $6 million. This
would suggest that the first counsel should receive 10/16 of the fee ($2.5
million) and the second counsel should receive 6/16 of the fee ($1.5
million). Notice that in this case, the first attorney's compensation falls
(from $3 million to $2.5 million). This would seem appropriate given
that the first counsel failed to maximize recovery for the class. If the
court approves the settlement, the funds would be distributed among the
class and counsel and the second counsel's bond would be vacated.
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This formula would not always result in a reduction of fee for the
first counsel. Suppose that the second counsel negotiated a settlement for
$12 million with an attorneys' fee of $4 million. The class would still be
better off than under the first settlement. If the new fee is approved and
allocated among the two attorneys according to the amount of recovery
they respectively obtained, the first counsel would get about $3.33
million (10/12 of $4 million) and the second counsel would get
$666,000. It does not make sense to increase the first attorney's
compensation because of the second counsel's contribution, especially
because the second counsel's efforts raise questions as to the
performance of the first. Accordingly, it would seem appropriate to cap
the compensation of the first counsel at the amount she would have
received under the initial settlement. With such a cap in place, the first
counsel would receive a fee of $3 million and the second counsel would
receive $1 million.
What happens if the new counsel obtains an inferior result for the
class? Say the new counsel eventually settles the matter for $8 million.
The shortfall of $2 million would be taken from the bond. The court
would revisit and approve the initial settlement, this time armed with the
information that the value obtained for the class in the initial settlement
has been tested in an adversarial context and proven to be substantial.
The first counsel would revive her request for the originally-negotiated
fee of $3 million, which the court would evaluate in light of the fact that
the second counsel tried and failed to obtain a better result.
What if the defendant settles the case in a different forum for less
than the original settlement, leaving counsel with an obligation to satisfy
the shortfall out of the bond?3 7 Suppose, in the example above, that an
attorney obtained lead counsel rights upon posting a $10 million bond.
Now the defendant settles the case in a different jurisdiction for $5
million less a $1 million fee. The defendant would be delighted with this
outcome since it is better off-by $5 million-than it would have been
under the initial settlement. Class counsel in the new jurisdiction is also
happy with the settlement because she receives a $1 million fee for
minimal effort. However, the new lead counsel in the first case would be
much worse off because she would have to pay over $3 million to the
class and $3 million to the original class counsel. If this strategy were
allowed, objector's counsel would rarely make ex post bids for lead
counsel rights because of the ease with which the case could be settled
37. See generally Geoffrey P. Miller, Overlapping Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 514
(1996); Henry Paul Monaghan, Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion Against Absent Nonresident
Class Members, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1148 (1998).
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out from under them. To address this problem, it would be appropriate
for the court in the first case to specify that the new lead counsel's bond
would be released if and to the extent that class claims are finally
resolved in a different forum."
Another scenario is the case in which the objector does not improve
the substantive terms of the settlement but does obtain a reduction in
attorneys' fees. Suppose in the example above that the winning bidder
eventually settled the case for $10 million, but agreed that the class
should receive $8 million and counsel should receive only $2 million.
This appears to be beneficial to the class because it reduces the fee. The
problem is that it would be too easy for new counsel to make such a
deal. Since the defendant is presumably indifferent as to who receives its
$10 million, it might agree to pay more to the class and less to the
attorneys, knowing that such an adjustment will enhance prospects for
judicial approval of the settlement. New counsel might request that the
trial court allocate $1.5 million of the fee to the original counsel and
$500,000 to herself. The result would be to cut the compensation of
original counsel in half. This deal between new counsel and defendant
would not reflect arm's-length bargaining and therefore should not be
accepted by the court without further investigation. If the court
concludes that the initial fee request of $3 million was justifiable, the
court should reject the proposed settlement and affirm the deal originally
presented ($3 million for original class counsel and $7 million for the
class).
A variant on this example is a case in which new counsel does
increase the overall recovery, but only slightly, and also negotiates a
better fee for the class. Suppose, for example, that the new counsel
agrees to settle the case for $11 million instead of $10 million, and
agrees also to a 20% fee rather than the 30% fee originally negotiated by
the first counsel. This second settlement should be carefully investigated
by the court because of the possibility that the new counsel is using the
improved fee structure as a means for obtaining a generous fee. In many
cases, however, the formula suggested above should generate sensible
outcomes. New counsel, in this case, would receive 1/11 of $2.2 million,
or $200,000-an amount that appears easy to justify in light of the $1
million improvement in total class compensation as well as the risk she
38. If settlement in the new forum has the effect of releasing the bond in the first forum, then
counsel would face the daunting task of persuading the court in the second case that a settlement is
fair, adequate, and reasonable when it provides less than they could have received in a proposed
settlement elsewhere. The bond should not be released, however, if the new class counsel
participated in any way in obtaining the settlement in the second forum.
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took on in posting the bond. The former counsel would receive a
reduction in her fee from $3 million to $2 million. This seems harsh but
might be justifiable in light of the fact that the previous counsel failed to
generate the best result for the class. To get the fee, moreover, new
counsel has to extract greater compensation from the defendant. Unlike
the case discussed above, where the defendant pays no more money in
the new settlement, here the defendant must cough up another $1
million. Moreover, by agreeing to reduce the fee from 30% to 20%, the
new counsel has reduced her own fee by $100,000. New counsel has, in
effect, bargained against her own interests. Where such bargaining takes
place, it may be surmised that the fee originally agreed to might have
been excessive. Thus, although the trial court must scrutinize cases like
this to ensure fairness to the original counsel, the risks appear fairly
small as long as the new counsel achieves an improvement in the overall
settlement.
III.

PROS AND CONS OF THE EX POST BID APPROACH

The ex post bid approach can increase recoveries for class members
and deter counsel from presenting inadequate proposals in the first place.
At the same time, the approach provides information about the value of
the proposed settlement in the form of a "super" objector whose
disagreement with the settlement is backed by a substantial financial
commitment. 9 Moreover, because bids for lead counsel rights at
settlement must be backed by adequate security, the procedure carries
little danger for the class.
This approach is not subject to many objections made against lead
counsel auctions. One of the paramount criticisms of ex ante lead
counsel auctions is that they do not maximize class recovery. 40 Having
won the auction for lead counsel rights with a percentage bid, the lead
counsel has the usual incentives to settle too early and for too little. And
because counsel is the low bidder, she may cut corners or refrain from
investments that would benefit the class, reducing the class recovery still
further.4 ' Ex post auctions would not be subject to these concerns.
Indeed, one of the arguments in favor of this approach is that it is likely
to increase the benefits to the class. The bond requirement guarantees
that the class will be no worse off if lead counsel rights are transferred;
39. The objector, in this sense, functions in a way similar to that of the private monitor
recommended in Klement, supra note 2, at 28.
40. See Bebchuk, supra note 32, at 899.
41. See id.
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and, having posted the bond, the new lead counsel has an incentive to
enhance class recovery in order to obtain a return of expenses and earn a
profit.
It is also argued that lead counsel auctions do not guarantee
reasonable fees.4 '2 This argument has little merit as applied to ex post
bids. The ex post bid does not purport to immunize counsel fees from
judicial scrutiny for reasonableness, and therefore is at least as good a
method for controlling fees as the traditional approach. Further, the ex
post bid can reduce fees because, if the new counsel negotiates more
reasonable compensation, the reduced fee percentage would usually be
folded back into the amounts received by the first counsel. The first
counsel's fees can only decrease or remain constant under the ex post bid
approach. Meanwhile, although new counsel can earn a fee-potentially
a generous fee-for participating in the case, that fee is also subject to
judicial scrutiny for reasonableness and can never make the class worse
off than it would be under the initial settlement proposal.
Some have argued that auctions do not economize on judicial
resources in light of the efforts that a court must undertake to structure a
successful auction. 43 A similar criticism could be directed at ex post bids
for lead counsel rights. Such bids would not reduce the burden on courts.
In fact, they could require the expenditure of increased judicial resources
because they would protract class action litigation that might otherwise
be settled. However, conserving judicial resources is not an absolute
value. Courts appropriately expend resources when doing so is necessary
to fulfill their responsibilities. A judge would not, for example, refuse to
hear a complex antitrust case on the ground that the trial would take a
long time. If in reviewing a class action settlement, the court receives a
bid for transfer of lead counsel rights backed by a substantial financial
commitment, this fact in itself would be good evidence that additional
time should be expended on the case to ensure that the class is well
represented. If trial courts are "fiduciaries" for class members, 44 there
would appear to be nothing problematic about expending the resources
necessary to ensure that the class receives the best possible
representation.

42. See Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 24, at 374.
43. See Lawyers on the Auction Block, supra note 32, at 691-92 (noting that auction design
and administration are complex tasks requiring substantial judicial resources); Third Circuit Task
Force Report, supra note 24, at 374-76.
44. See Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279-80 (7th Cir. 2002) (describing
the role of a trial court reviewing a proposed class action settlement as that of a "fiduciary").
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Lead counsel auctions have been criticized as not placing the
interests of the class in the most capable hands. 45 The idea is that the
attorney willing to take the case for the lowest percentage of the
recovery is unlikely to be the one best qualified to carry out the
representation. Quality of representation is not a serious problem for ex
post bids, however. Because the ex post bidder is required to post a bond
protecting the class against unfavorable outcomes, the quality of the
bidder is not a matter of crucial importance. Further, any lawyer willing
to post the required bond presumably believes that she has a capacity to
extract more from the defendant.
Informational difficulties have also been mentioned as a
problematic feature of ex ante lead counsel auctions. 6 Bidders may not
know much about the case, and thus may shave their offers in order to
protect against the risk of overpaying. The result may be that the class
receives lower compensation than what would be paid if the strength of
the case were known. But this argument applies only to auctions
conducted at the outset of a case. By the time the case is presented to the
trial court for evaluation of possible settlement, much more will be
known. Plaintiffs' counsel will have conducted discovery in order to
evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the claims. Pleadings and
arguments by the defendant will identify the defenses that will be
interposed to liability and damages. The sufficiency of those arguments
may have been tested in pretrial motions. The parties will have had the
chance to evaluate one another's bargaining strategies through
settlement discussions. 7 The parties, moreover, are usually required to
share their evaluations with the court in order to justify the compromise.
The court will also have developed its own sense of the case.48 Perhaps
most importantly, the bond requirement protects against excessively low
bids. In effect, the settlement itself represents an informed bid for the
case. Any ex post bidder for lead counsel rights must meet or beat the
defendant's bid. Thus problems of valuation that may distort, for
example, lead counsel auctions, are simply not present in ex post bids.
Ex ante lead counsel auctions are sometimes said to be afflicted by
problems of comparing bids.4 ' The argument is that bidders may set up
45. See Bebchuk, supra note 32, at 890 (noting that auctions would undervalue qualitative
dimensions of the choice of counsel); Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 24, at 382.
46. See Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 24, at 387.
47. Indeed, it would arguably be irresponsible for counsel to present a settlement proposal to
the court unless the case has been rather carefully valued in order to assess the fairness of the
defendant's settlement offer.
48. See Aggregation, Auctions, and Other Developments, supra note 32, at 88.
49. See Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 24, at 378-79.
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different schedules correlating proposed fees with levels of class
recovery, resulting in difficulties for assessing which bid is better: a bid
may be more favorable to the class at one point and less favorable at
others." In the case of ex post lead counsel bids, comparability issues are
not a serious concern. The choice is between two outcomes: one that is
presented to the court in the form of a settlement, and the other that
promises to be as good or better for the class. It is not difficult for the
court to assess such a choice.
Ex ante lead counsel auctions have been criticized as requiring
subjective evaluations as to the quality of counsel.5' But quality control
is always required in class actions regardless of how counsel is selected.
Ex post bids, moreover, present features that reduce the importance of
quality vetting. Unlike other means for selecting lead counsel, ex post
bids offer the protection of the bond requirement, which places a floor
on class recovery and thus protects against the worst outcomes that
could occur if counsel proved ineffective. The bond requirement also
provides assurance that the bidder believes she is able to provide
effective service. The subjectivity of the court's evaluation of class
counsel's abilities is thus less of a concern for ex post lead counsel bids.
A well-recognized problem with ex ante lead counsel auctions is
the need to compensate attorneys who have identified the claim and
investigated its merits prior to filing a suit.52 If new counsel could freeride on another lawyer's costly preliminary work and then usurp the
case, incentives to develop cases for litigation might be undermined.53
This problem of compensating first movers is also present in ex post lead
counsel bids. Here, the "first mover" is the original lead counsel who
developed and litigated the case and negotiated the proposed settlement.
It would obviously be undesirable for an ex post lead counsel bid to
deprive the first attorney of fair compensation for her services. However,
the approach described above makes provisions to protect the original
lead counsel. If the bidder fails to improve on the settlement, the court
will call on the bond to compensate the class and its original counsel. In
such a case, the original counsel's claim to a fee is not impaired and may
even be strengthened: since another lawyer had a shot at the case and
50. See id. at 378-80.
51. See Lawyers on the Auction Block, supra note 32, at 685-90 (identifying problems with
quality evaluation); Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 24, at 380-8 !.
52. See Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 24, at 381.
53. See id. In the case of ex ante lead counsel auctions, this problem can be addressed by
providing a bounty to the lawyers who investigated the lawsuit if they are not selected as lead
counsel. See ht re Bank One S'holders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780, 785 (N.D. I11.2000)
(indicating that investigating counsel would receive compensation for services to the class).
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was unable to improve the outcome, the quality of the original counsel's
services is vindicated by a market test, thus strengthening the fee
request. It is true that under an ex post bid approach the original
counsel's fee can be reduced if the new counsel obtains a superior result.
But this hardly seems unfair since the original counsel has been shown
to have obtained too little. Even in such a case the original counsel
would receive a reasonable fee as measured by the respective
contributions to the class recovery. Overall, the fees can be set so as to
reward the new counsel for taking on the risk of a bad outcome and for
generating an improved result for the class while not unduly penalizing
the original attorney.
Some have criticized ex ante lead counsel auctions on the ground
that there are too few bidders.54 The problem, according to these critics,
is that firms find it too expensive to prepare bids, in light of the
possibility that they will not win the auction and the risk that their fees
will eventually be reduced.55 In the case of ex post lead counsel bids,
there are also likely to be few bidders. In fact, it would be uncommon for
there to be more than one. However, the lack of numerous bidders is not
a problem because the bidder's bond must at least equal the value of the
settlement. Further, there is no risk that the process will fall apart
because of a lack of bidders: one "bid" (the proposed settlement) will
always be on the table even if no competitors for lead counsel rights
appear. Thus, the shortage of qualified bidders would not be a serious
problem for ex post bids.
Some have argued that ex post lead counsel auctions threaten the
court's neutrality.56 The idea is that the court must form a preliminary
opinion as to the merits of the case in evaluating the competing bids, and
that this may create an unintentional but distinct bias against the
defendant as the case progresses 7 Whether or not this idea has merit in
the context of ex ante auctions, it is no objection to ex post bids. By the
time of the settlement, the trial court will have had numerous
opportunities to review the case. And unlike the case of ex ante auctions,
which may require an early peek into the merits that would not otherwise
be conducted, the ex post bid for lead counsel rights would require no
more than what the court is required to do in any event. Indeed, if the
concern is for adversarial presentation, ex post bids would enhance
rather than detract from the integrity of information presented to the
54. See, e.g., Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 24, at 382-83.
55. See id. at 382.
56. See id. at 383-84.
57. See Aggregation, Auctions, and Other Developments, supra note 32, at 95.
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court since at this point both the defendant and class counsel are aligned
in promoting the proposed settlement.
Lead counsel auctions have also been criticized on the ground that
they create a public perception of windfalls to attorneys.58 But the ex post
bid recommended in this article would not create windfalls. It would not
substitute for judicial review of the reasonableness of the proposed fee.
Far from generating windfalls, ex post lead counsel bids could keep fees
in check because they could reduce the fees awarded to the initial lead
counsel.
Ex post bids do have potential shortcomings. The amounts and risks
involved would deter many attorneys from making bids. In the example
presented above, any bidder for ex post lead counsel rights would have
to come up with a guarantee of at least $10 million. It should be noted,
however, that a guarantee is not paid until drawn on. The plaintiffs' bar
has members with funds sufficient to make this kind of commitment.' 9 A
related objection is that the guarantee, in addition to being expensive to
obtain, creates significant financial risks for the bidder. If the eventual
outcome of the case is below what was presented to the court in the
original settlement, the bidder would forfeit some or all of the bond and
would receive no fee for her services. Many lawyers would prefer to
avoid such risky investments when other, safer cases are available.
However, the bond requirement does not impose unlimited risks.
Presumably, attorneys would seek lead counsel rights ex post only if
they believed that the settlement in question could readily be improved.
Thus, people would post bonds in cases where they believed there was a
substantial probability that the bond would never be called. Further, the
most serious risk-the possibility that the case would be sold out from
under counsel by settlement in another jurisdiction-would not trigger
obligations under the bond.60 And the risks of posting the bond would be
weighed against the potential for a lucrative fee if new counsel obtains
an enhanced recovery. All these factors suggest that, despite the risks,
some cases might be candidates for ex post transfers of lead counsel
rights. This is not to say that the pool of potential bidders for ex post
lead counsel rights would be enormous, but it appears to be sufficiently
large to generate bids in some cases.
The ex post bid approach also faces difficulties of appraisal. To
determine that the proposed bond will protect the class against being
worse off under new lead counsel than under the proposed settlement,
58. See Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 24, at 384-85.
59. See id. at 342-43.
60. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
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the court must evaluate and assign a financial value to the settlement. In
many cases, it would not be easy for a court to make this judgment. For
example, the settlement may include elements of injunctive relief that
are difficult to value. The settlement may provide compensation for
injuries and harms that have not yet developed and which may never
become manifest. 6' Future payments may have to be discounted to
present value, using some interest rate appropriate for the class.62 The
61
settlement may include non-pecuniary forms of relief such as coupons
or reversionary funds that are recaptured by the defendant if not fully
claimed. 64 These are substantial problems, but they are not
insurmountable. It is, presumably, the court's responsibility to value the
settlement whether or not a party comes forward with an ex post bid for
lead counsel rights. Thus, when an ex post.lead counsel bid is made, it
would merely require the court to quantify with greater precision a value
that the court is required to appraise in any event. In fact, the presence of
an ex post bid can have a disciplining effect because the court would be
forced to engage in a more careful effort at quantification.
Ex post bids would have their greatest potential for improving class
action litigation in the context of "reverse auctions"-cases in which the
defendant effectively selects the class counsel willing to settle the case
most cheaply.65 In such a case, some members of the class will be
represented by counsel in an overlapping case that will be mooted if the
proposal is approved. Counsel for the overlapping class has a strong
incentive to appear and object to the settlement in order to preserve the
value of her investment. This attorney knows a great deal about the case
because she represents a competing class. And, if it is a true reverse
auction situation, this attorney knows that the relief obtained for the
class falls short of what could be obtained in litigation that was not

61. See Coffee, supra note 21, at 1430.
62. This may differ from market rates. See Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277,
287 (7th Cir. 2002).
63. See generally Severin Borenstein, Settling for Coupons: Discount Contracts as
Compensation and Punishment in Antitrust Lawsuits, 39 J.L. & ECON. 379 (1996); Christopher R.
Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in Antitrust and Consumer Class Action
Litigation, 49 UCLA L. REV. 991 (2002); Miller & Singer, supra note 17; Note, In-Kind Class
Action Settlements, 109 HARV. L. REV. 810 (1996).
64. See Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 482 (1980); Waters v. Int'l Precious Metals
Corp., 190 F.3d 1291, 1292, 1300 (11 th Cit. 1999) (upholding $40 million reversionary settlement
of which only about $6.5 million was claimed).
65. See generally Coffee, supra note 21, at 1350; Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg,
"Sweetheart" and "Blackmail" Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1377, 1390-91 (2000). For a case where the court suggested that a reverse auction may have
taken place, see Reynolds, 288 F.3d at 282.
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marred by collusion between defendant and plaintiff's counsel. All these
factors provide an incentive to file the necessary bond in order to obtain
a transfer of lead counsel rights. In such cases, ex post lead counsel bids
can provide value by placing impediments in the path of harmful
settlements.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Competing bids in class action settlements are no panacea to the
problem of controlling agency costs and protecting the class against poor
representation. But they do offer a potentially valuable supplement to
existing procedures in some cases. They could correct some settlements
that offer poor relief for the class and overly generous fees for attorneys,
and appear to be especially useful at combating reverse auctions. Ex post
lead counsel bids are not subject to many of the problems that threaten
the utility of ex ante auctions. It appears, moreover, that courts have
ample authority under existing law to invite such bids.66 Ex post bids for
lead counsel rights may be worth further investigation as one means
among others for improving the fairness of class action settlements.

66. Courts have inherent authority to require posting of bonds in appropriate circumstances.
See Pedraza v. United Guar. Corp., 313 F.3d 1323, 1325 (11 th Cir. 2002).
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